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Akers v. Baldwin: The Broad Form
Deed Dilemma Revisited
INTRODUCTION
An article in the initial publication of this Journal' addressed
the constitutionality of Kentucky's Mineral Deed Act 2 and con-
cluded that "it is clear that the final word on broad form deeds
in Kentucky has yet to be heard." 3 Two years later in Akers v.
Baldwin, the Kentucky Supreme Court proved the truth of those
words.4 Akers is the latest in a long line of decisions addressing
the rights granted by the infamous broad form deed.' This
Comment will address the ramifications of Akers v. Baldwin in
a three pronged analysis: (1) summarizing the judicial history of
broad form deeds so as to put the Akers decision in proper
perspective, (2) analyzing the holding of Akers, and (3) assessing
the future implications of the decision.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. Broad Form Deed
Owners of real property have the right to sever the mineral
and surface estates. 6 This right to sever, which creates separate
and distinct legal estates in land, results in a conflict between
the owners of the surface and the owners of the minerals there-
' Pfeiffer, Kentucky's New Broad Form Deed Law - Is it Constitutional?, 1 J.
MiN. L. & POL'Y 57 (1985).
1 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN, §§ 381.930-.945 (Bobbs-Merrill 1984) [hereinafter KRS].
See infra note 90 for the text of the statute.
Pfeiffer, supra note 1, at 96.
Akers v. Baldwin, 736 S.W.2d 294 (Ky. 1987).
See infra notes 11-14 and accompanying text.
Kincaid v. McGowen, 4 S.W. 802 (Ky. 1887). See Pfeiffer, supra note 1, at 57
(noting 4 S.W. 802).
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under. 7 The use of the broad form deed as a vehicle for severing
the mineral estate from the surface estate has further spurred
the conflict.
The typical broad form deed is described as a form that
provides mineral owners the right to "use and operate the same
and surface thereof . . . in any manner that may be deemed
necessary or convenient for mining." 8 In addition, the deed
contains a release by the surface owner of any claim for damages
inflicted by the mineral owner in the use of the surface. 9 The
broad form deed was commonly employed in the Eastern Ken-
tucky coal fields in the early 1900s to acquire mineral rights.' 0
It is known for the tremendously detailed description of the
rights conveyed." Inevitably, the duty of interpreting these deeds,
especially regarding the right to strip mine, has been left to the
court of last resort in the Commonwealth.
B. Broad Form Deed Interpretation-Pre-Buchanan
One of the first Kentucky cases to interpret the respective
rights of the mineral and surface owners under a broad form
deed was Mclntire v. Marion Coal Co..12 Specifically, the high
court evaluated the right of the surface owners to use the surface
for agricultural purposes according to the provisions of a 1907
deed. The deed granted the mineral owners the right "to use
and operate the said land and the surface thereof"' 3 as deemed
necessary or convenient for the full and free exercise and enjoy-
ment of any and all the property. 14 The deed also contained a
reservation to the surface owners that provided for the use of
7 736 S.W.2d at 297 (The court noted that the severance can be achieved by a
lease of the mineral rights, by a deed creating a fee simple interest in the minerals, and
by a sale of the surface with a reservation of the minerals.).
8 Schneider, Strip Mining in Kentucky, 59 KY. L.J. 652, 653 (1971).
9Id.
10 Martin v. Kentucky Oak Mining Company, 429 S.W.2d 395, 396 (Ky. 1968).
1 See Watson v. Kenlick Coal Co., 498 F.2d 1183 (6th Cir. 1974) (for an example
of the tedious description of the rights conveyed by a broad form deed). Pfeiffer, supra
note 1, at 59 (noting 498 F.2d 1183).
12 227 S.W. 298 (Ky. 1921).
" Id. at 298.
14 Id. (emphasis added).
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the surface for agricultural purposes, so long as that use did not
conflict with the rights of the mineral estate owner."5
In evaluating the rights of the surface owners to use the
surface, the court stated:
The Marion Coal Company has the right and could by showing
the necessity or convenience thereof use and occupy the whole
surface of the land in question, even to excluding the plaintiff
[surface owner] and taking his house and garden ... [t]he
mineral estate under the deed is dominant, superior and exclu-
sive in every circumstance or condition where the owner thereof
shall deem it necessary or convenient to make such use of the
surface as the deed allows.
6
The court, in granting these broad rights to the mineral
owner, did state that the coal company was to provide satisfac-
tion or adjudged compensation for damage to improvements.
7
However, the damages provision set forth in McIntire was dis-
regarded in later decisions, only to be resuscitated by Akers v.
Baldwin.
Fifteen years after the decision in McIntire, the court further
expanded the rights of the mineral estate owner by holding that
a deed conveying minerals included the right to remove the
minerals by strip mining, as opposed to the traditional deep
shaft method. 8 This decision set the stage for the plethora of
law suits which followed.
C. Broad Form Deed Interpretation in Buchanan v. Watson
Buchanan v. Watson 9 squarely addressed the right of a
mineral owner to strip mine under a broad form deed. The deed
in question, granted to John C.C. Mayo 0 in 1903, was an
I ld. at 299.
, Id. at 300.
" Id.
, Rudd v. Hayden, 97 S.W.2d 35 (Ky. 1936).
290 S.W.2d 40 (Ky. 1956). (The court decided one related case, Treadway v.
Wilson, 192 S.W.2d 949 (Ky. 1946), in between 97 S.W.2d 35 and 290 S.W.2d 40. The
court in Treadway held that the mineral owner had the paramount right to the use of
the surface, but remanded for the trial court to determine if the proposed method for
excavation .was oppressive.).
20 See H. CAUDILL, NIGHT COMES TO THE CUMBERLANDS 72-76, 305-07 (1962)
(describing the life and accomplishments of the legendary John C.C. Mayo).
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"archetypal broad form deed;" that is, it severed the mineral
estate, granted all mineral rights to Mayo, and waived any claims
of damages against the grantee.
2'
The Buchanan court noted that the Chancellor had found
the only feasible way to excavate was by strip mining, that strip
mining would result in the destruction of the surface above the
coal, 22 and that the parties of the deed had not contemplated
strip mining nor destruction of the surface. 23 Nonetheless, the
court held that the parties intended to convey the coal and that
to deny strip mining, which was the only feasible process for
removal, would defeat the principle purpose of the deed. 24 In
addition, the court held that the mineral owner would not be
liable to the surface owner for damages unless the mineral owner
exercised his rights "oppressively, arbitrarily, wantonly or ma-
liciously. '25
The ultimate effect of the Buchanan decision was succinctly
summarized in the Akers v. Baldwin decision by Chief Justice
Stephens who wrote:
under our decision in Buchanan, the owners of mineral rights
under a typical broad form deed have virtually absolute right
to mine the minerals by any means, past, present or future,
and in the course of such mining to literally obliterate the
surface with little or no recourse for the surface owner.
26
Although criticism of the Buchanan decision flowed fast and
free, an analysis of the criticism is beyond the scope of this
comment 27
2, Greenwall, On the Constitutionality of Kentucky's Mineral Deed Act, 13 N.
KY. L. REv. 219 (1986).
11 290 S.W.2d at 42.
23 Id. at 42.
2. Id.
25 Id. at 43.
2 736 S.W.2d at 302.
27 See Randall & Pagoulatos, Surface Mining Environmental Quality: An Economic
Perspective, 64 KY. L.J. 549 (1975-76); Schneider, supra note 8; Note, Kentucky's
Experience with the Broad Form Deed, 63 KY. L.J. 107 (1974-75); Pfeiffer, supra note
1, at 62. See also Annotation, Grant, Reservation, or Lease of Minerals and Mining
Rights as Including, Without Expressly So Providing, The Right to Remove the Minerals
By Surface Mining, 70 A.L.R. 3RD 383 (1976).
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D. Broad Form Deed Interpretation-Post-Buchanan
Four years after the decision in Buchanan, its holding was
expanded to permit auger or strip mining28-even when conven-
tional methods were available. 29 In 1960 Kentucky's high court
decided Wiser Oil Co. v. Conley,3° which involved a lease exe-
cuted in 1917 granting the lessee oil and gas rights.3 In Wiser,
the plaintiff oil company began production under the lease by
"water flooding" which resulted in extensive damage to the
defendant's surface.32 After distinguishing Buchanan because that
deed contained a waiver of damages,33 the court allowed the
surface owner to recover damages by unanimously concluding
that:
it was the intention of the parties that oil should be produced
by drilling in the customary manner that prevailed when the
lease was executed. Any exemption from liability would there-
,, Blue Diamond Coal Co. v. Neace, 337 S.W.2d 725 (Ky. 1960) (The court
indicated that the mineral estate had been severed by a deed "virtually identical" to the
one in Buchanan v. Watson, 290 S.W.2d 40 (Ky. 1956). The court's holding that the
mineral owner had the right to choose any technique was in response to an argument
that deep mining would have sufficiently recovered the coal. Id.
19 Kodak Coal Co. v. Smith, 338 S.W.2d 699 (Ky. 1960) (Based on facts analagous
to those in 337 S.W.2d 725, the court unanimously held that the mineral owner had the
right to mine by strip and auger even though the trial court found that the coal could
be mined by other methods.).
30 346 S.W.2d 718 (Ky. 1960).
Id. at 720.
3 Id. "Water flooding is a method of forcing oil from underground by pumping
water into the wells." Id.
11 Id. at 721. The court reasoned that:
There is a vital difference between the terms and conditions of the mineral
deed involved in the Buchanan case and the language embraced in the oil
and gas lease under consideration here. The mineral deed contained an
express waiver of damages which this Court stated was sufficiently broad
to prohibit a recovery for any destruction of damages from strip mining
that might result to the surface. The waiver of damages condition was the
controlling feature in the Buchanan case. On the other hand, the oil and
gas lease has no stated waiver provision and futhermore, we do not believe
such a provision can be read into it. Id.
But see Crowley v. Round Mountain Coal Co., 374 S.W.2d 825 (Ky. 1964) (The court
said "the waiver-of-damage clause was not a controlling factor in the Buchanan deci-
sion.").
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fore be limited to the damages which might be caused by this
contemplated means of bringing oil to the top.
3 4
In 1968 the court's unanimous support of the Buchanan
doctrine splintered. In Martin v. Kentucky Oak Mining Co.,"
the court split 4-3 in favor of following Buchanan.36 As for
Wiser, the majority stated, "We do not feel compelled in this
to explain, justify, reconcile or distinguish Wiser. The court has
decided to adhere to Buchanan whether or not it conflicts with
Wiser. " 37
Commerce Union Bank v. Kinkade"' was the last decision in
the procession of cases following Buchanan. In Commerce Un-
ion, the court prohibited a coal company from strip mining the
coal by holding that the deed in question39 was not a broad form
deed. 4° According to the majority in Akers, the effect of Com-
merce Union was to limit the virtually unfettered power of the
mineral owner over the surface owner to broad form deeds and
to require that each challenged deed be considered on a case-by-
case method 1.4  The court in Commerce Union mandated that
the mineral owner could conduct mining operations contrary to
the rights usually implied in a mineral deed when the deed
severing the minerals resulted "in a definite enlargement of
specified mining rights.
'42
34 Id. at 722 (In allowing the surface owner to recover for damage that resulted
in a method of mining that was not contemplated when the deed was entered, the court
substantially departed from Buchanan v. Watson, 290 S.W.2d 40 (Ky. 1956).). In 290
S.W.2d 40, damages were denied regardless of the fact that the destructive process was
not contemplated by the parties to the deed. Supra, notes 19-27 and accompanying text.
11 429 S.W.2d 395 (Ky. 1968).
36 Id. at 399. The majority recognized the merit and persuasiveness of the land-
owner's argument. However, the arguments were not deemed sufficiently forceful "to
prevail against the long entrenched role of our previous cases in reliance upon which
property rights have vested." Id.
17 Id. at 402. (Dissenting Judge Hill responded with the often cited observation,
"Wiser and Buchanan are as inconsistent as sin and salvation.").
" 540 S.W.2d 861 (Ky. 1976).
39 Id. at 862-63.
• Id. at 864. The court examined the cases which involved broad form deeds and
concluded that the mineral deeds in 540 S.W.2d 861 did not contain language so extensive
as to subordinate the rights of the surface estate to the demands of the mineral estate.
736 S.W.2d at 304.
540 S.W.2d at 863.
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II. Akers v. Baldwin-The Holding
A. Factual Background
The final opinion handed down as Akers v. Baldwin actually
reflects the Kentucky Supreme Court's decision on two cases
43
consolidated by the court. In the first, Akers v. Baldwin, Everett
Akers and several other property owners in Floyd County, Ken-
tucky filed suit in U.S. District Court against the Kentucky
Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Cabinet. These
surface owners sought an injunction" prohibiting the state from
issuing mining permits to the mineral owner, Falcon Coal Com-
pany. Akers contended that the deed which severed the mineral
and surface estates did not give the right to strip mine; 45 he also
relied upon the Mineral Deed Act46 with which the Kentucky
legislature intended to govern the legal consequences of the
relationship between the mineral and surface estates when a
severance 7 has been effected. Akers' injunction request con-
tended that the state regulatory agency's decision to issue a
mining permit was a violation of the Surface Mining Control
and Reclamation Act (SMCRA),4 which required the state agency
to enforce its federally-approved program.4 9 If the state fails to
meet SMCRA requirements, the Office of Surface Mining is
entitled to enforce the guidelines. 50 Falcon Coal and other mining
interests5' challenged the constitutionality of the Mineral Deed
41 736 S.W.2d at 296.
" Akers v. Baldwin, 785 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1986) (table) (text in Westlaw).
45 Id.
See infra notes 89-96 and accompanying text.
4' See 4 D. VfSH, CoAL LAW AND REGULATION, § 80.01[31 (1983) (describing the
doctrine of severability in the context).
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 § 522 [hereinafter SMCRA],
30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1982).
19 785 F.2d 307.
- SMCRA § 504, 30 U.S.C. § 1254 (1982). "Secretary shall prepare . . . prom-
ulgate and implement a federal program for a state ... if such state ... fails to
implement, enforce, or maintain its approved state program so provided for in this
chapter." Id.
51 Brief of Intervenors at 1, Akers v. Baldwin, 85 SC-392-CL (Ky. July 2, 1987)
(The other intervening coal companies were Golden Oak Mining Co., Highland Coal,
Inc., Lost Mountain Mining, Inc., Penbroke Coal Co., and Shamrock Coal Co.).
19881
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Act and the Kentucky Supreme Court certified the constitutional
issue. 2
In the second case, Baker v. Wooten, 3 Baker had been
denied access to the Wooten property in which Baker's lessors
held the mineral rights which had been severed from the surface
estate by a 1910 deed.14 The Wootens contended that the new
broad form deed statute" constituted a bar to the strip mining
of their property.16 The Perry Circuit Court declared that the
recently enacted 57 statutes were determinative and precluded the
strip mining of the property. 8 The Kentucky Supreme Court
granted a request that the subsequent appeal of this ruling be
transferred .9
B. Majority Holding
1. Right To Strip Mine Under A Broad Form Deed
The court first addressed the correctness of the thirty-one
year old Buchanan v. Watson decision. The majority observed
that an analysis of Buchanan involved two major issues: the
right of the mineral owner to strip mine, and the obligation to
respond with damages for the use of the surfaceP °
In addressing the right of the mineral owner to strip mine,
the court summarized the holdings of prior cases by stating that
"the only restriction (unless one appears in the deed) is that the
use of said surface may not be oppressive, arbitrary, malicious
or wanton. ' 61 The Akers court then reexamined and reaffirmed
11 Akers v. Baldwin, 736 S.W.2d 294 (Ky. 1987).
51 Baker v. Wooten, No. 83-C[-429 (Perry Cir. Ct. 1983).
736 S.W.2d at 296.
See infra notes 89-96 and accompanying text.
,6 736 S.W.2d at 297.
KRS § 381.940 (enacted July 13, 1984). See infra notes 89-96 and accompanying
text.
736 S.W.2d at 297.
59 Id.
- Id. at 304.
1, Id. This standard was set forth in Buchanan v. Watson, 290 S.W.2d 40, 43 (Ky.
1956).
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the cases establishing this rule. 62 The court surmised that the
provisions in broad form deeds are clear and overwhelming and,
in the absence of ambiguity, extrinsic evidence could not be
introduced to vary or explain the deeds. 6a The fact that a certain
technique of mining was not known at the time the deed was
created was "simply not relevant." 64
In limiting the introduction of extrinsic evidence to situations
involving ambiguity, the court accepted the coal companies'
argument that "unless an instrument is found to be ambiguous,
the intention of the parties must be gathered from what it
says. '" 65 Moreover, the court aided the mineral owners' position
by refusing to consider whether strip mining was contemplated
when the broad form deed was executed. 66
In accepting the contention of the mineral owners, the court
rejected a variety of arguments proffered by the surface owners
supporting the proposition that Buchanan was a faulty decision.
Specifically, the surface owners contended that Buchanan was
"a radical departure ' 67 from traditional deed construction, and
it allowed the mineral owner to destroy the surface by a method
of extraction that the parties had not contemplated. 6 The land-
owners insisted that the court should follow the guidelines set
62 736 S.W.2d at 302-04. See supra notes 6-42 and accompanying text for an
analysis of the relevant cases.
63 736 S.W.2d at 304.
Id. at 305.
65 Brief of Intervenors, supra note 51, at 9. The coal companies relied upon the
following authority: Kentucky-West Virginia Gas Company v. Browning, 521 S.W.2d
516 (Ky. 1975); Lambert v. Prichard, 284 S.W.2d 90 (Ky. 1955); Gibson v. Sellers, 252
S.W.2d 911 (Ky. 1952); Bland v. Kentucky Coal Corporation, 206 S.W.2d 62 (Ky. 1947).
Id.
Id. The mineral owners place great reliance upon Gibson v. Sellers, 252 S.W.2d
911 (Ky. 1952) for the proposition that specific contemplation of surface mining by the
parties was irrelevant. The case involved the question of whether or not the conveyance
of "minerals" at a time when oil rights had little or no value and were not important
should be construed as including oil and gas. "Minerals" was deemed to include oil and
gas, and the intention of the parties was limited to the four corners of the agreement.
63 Brief of plaintiff Everett Akers at 47, Akers v. Baldwin, 85-SC-392-CL (Ky.
July 2, 1987) (Plaintiff cites the following as representative of the traditional and
applicable method of deed construction in Kentucky: Combs v. Combs, 166 S.W.2d 969
(Ky. 1942); Chaney v. Chaney, 189 S.W.2d 268 (Ky. 1945); Smith v. Kentland Coal and
Coke Company, 276 S.W.2d 663 (Ky. 1955).).
Id. at 48.
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forth in Wiser Oil Company v. Conley69 and Holladay v. Pea-
body Coal Company,70 which indicated that the intention of the
parties at the time the deed was executed should control.
7'
2. Obligation To Pay Damages To The Surface Owner
After thirty years of allowing the Buchanan doctrine to
dominate the mining industry, in Akers v. Baldwin the Kentucky
Supreme Court finally signalled its readiness to join the growing
trend toward allowing damages for surface destruction. Al-
though the court upheld Buchanan to the extent it allowed the
mineral owner to strip mine under a broad form deed,
72 it
reversed that portion of Buchanan that upheld the waiver of
damages provisions in broad form deeds. 73 Specifically, the court
mandated that, if the owner of minerals under a broad form
deed causes injury to the surface when recovering such minerals,
"the mineral owner shall respond in damages to the owner of
the surface."'74 Stating that "the doctrine of stare decisis impels
us to overrule precedent only with considerable thought and
care,"'75 the court decided that the injustice worked by a denial
of damages caused it to reconsider and reverse Buchanan's literal
application of a waiver of damages as illogical, unfair, and
contrary to the best interest of the public.
76
To illustrate the injustice which prompted this reversal, the
court stated that in denying damages to the surface, "[tihis in
the land is not the servient estate, it is no estate. ' 77 The court
stressed that the destruction of the surface "would never have
been anticipated ' 7 8 by the grantor of the mineral estate and that
it was "grossly unconscionable to allow such harm without the
69 346 S.W.2d 718 (Ky. 1960).
- 560 S.W.2d 550 (Ky. 1977) (Peabody sought to acquire a permanent easement
for constructing and maintaining a roadway and coal conveyor system over land of
appellants from a mine opening not located on appellant's properties.).
7, 346 S.W.2d at 722; 560 S.W.2d at 554-55.





77 736 S.W.2d at 306.
11 Id. at 307.
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awarding of damages." 79 The court opined that it was highly
unlikely that the parties who entered the agreement creating the
two estates knew or contemplated that the surface could or
would be totally destroyed without recourse for the original
party. s0 The court also observed that Kentucky was "standing
naked and alone" 8' with its denial of damages for the surface
estate. In overruling the damages portion of Buchanan, the court
added, that "to the extent Commerce Union Bank v. Kinkade
is inconsistent with the present opinion, Commerce Union Bank
is overruled." 82
In allowing the surface owner to recover damages, the court
deemed relevant the knowledge, contemplations, and anticipa-
tions of the parties concerning the resultant surface destruction.
By comparison, these factors were deemed "simply not relevant"83
when determining that broad form deeds grant the right to strip
mine.
The court limited recovery of damages under broad form
deeds to those deeds which severed the estates prior to the
effective date of Buchanan (May 4, 1956) and after July 2,
1987.84 In effect, those broad form deeds that were used to sever
minerals in reliance upon Buchanan were excluded from payment
79 Id.
80 Id.
I, d. at 306. In noting that Kentucky is standing "naked and alone in the view
under Buchanan," the court cites the following decisions of other jurisdictions and then
indicates that it was time for a change: Doochin v. Rackley, 610 S.W.2d 715 (Tenn.
1981); Phipps v. Leftwich, 222 S.E.2d 535 (Va. 1976); Franklin v. Callicoat, 119 N.E.2d
688 (Ohio 1954); West Virginia-Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Stoney, 42 S.E.2d 46 (W. Va.
1947); Barker v. Mintz, 215 P. 534 (Colo. 1923); Stewart v. Chernicky, 266 A.2d 259
(Pa. 1970). Id. However, study of these six cases reveals that four of them prohibited
strip mining under facts comparable to those at hand. Only two, Barker and Stewart,
allowed strip mining to proceed if damages were paid to the surface estate. Further,
Barker permitted strip mining, coupled with payment for damages, if the surface was
wild and used only for pasturage.
' 736 S.W.2d at 304. See infra notes 106-12 and accompanying text.
'3 736 S.W.2d at 305. See supra text accompanying note 64.
The slip opinion excluded payment of damages for severance "made between
the effective date of Buchanan and the finality date of this decision." Akers v. Baldwin,
85-SC-392-CL, at 28 (Ky. July 2, 1987). Since the finality date was not until September
24, 1987 an eleven week window period existed in which mineral owners could transfer
property without paying compensation. The final decision changed that wording to read
the "initial decision date" effectively eliminating this loophole. See Louisville Courier
Journal, Sept. 25, 1987 § A, at 1, col. 5.
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of damages. Damages would still be precluded where a severance
deed contained both a waiver of damages and a specific descrip-
tion of the mining method to be used. 5
The court opted for a common method of determining dam-
ages, known as the diminution measure:16
The measure of damages shall be the difference in the market
value of the surface estate, including all improvements thereon,
immediately before and immediately after the use of the sur-
face by the mineral owner. 'Use of the surface' shall include
any and all reclamation of the surface by the mineral owner.87
This measure has been the standard measure of permanent dam-
ages to real property in Kentucky.8"
3. Constitutionality of Kentucky's Mineral Deed Act
In 198489 the Kentucky General Assembly addressed the
growing controversy by passing the Mineral Deed ActY° The Act
85 736 S.W.2d at 305.
16 D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 5.1 (1973).
736 S.W.2d at 307.
ss See Middle States Coal Co. v. Hicks, 608 S.W.2d 56 (Ky. App. 1980); Texaco,
Inc. v. Melton, 463 S.W.2d 301 (Ky. 1971); Kentucky Stone Co. v. Gaddie, 396 S.W.2d
337 (Ky. 1965); River Queen Coal Co. v. Mencer, 379 S.W.2d 461 (Ky. 1964); United
Fuel Co. v. Rowe, 375 S.W.2d 264 (Ky. 1964).
89 In 1974 the General Assembly passed legislation requiring that an application
for a strip mining permit could not be issued without consent of the surface owner,
even though the deed severing the mineral estate gave the mineral owner the right to
strip mine. KRS § 350.060(2) (1974). The Kentucky Supreme Court, however, ruled the
statute unconstitutional in Department for Natural Resources and Environmental Pro-
tection v. No. 8 Ltd., 528 S.W.2d 684 (Ky. 1975).
- KRS §§ 381.935-.945 (1984). The Statute reads as follows:
381.930. Purposes of KRS § 381.935 to 381.945. - The purposes of KRS §
381.935 to 381.945 are as follows:
(1) To facilitate and require the demonstration of a clear understanding
between the owners of surface and mineral estates in land concerning their
respective rights to use and occupy or injure the surface of the land;
(2) To protect the security of titles to land and improvements thereto;
(3) To promote the free alienability of land;
(4) To prevent hardship and injustice to surface or mineral owners arising
from uncertainty of the law;
(5) To promote the conservation and the full and efficient use of all natural
resources of the state, including the land, the making of improvements to
the land, the growth of agriculture, the development of the new industry
[VOL. 4:213
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provided a rule of construction for deeds severing the mineral
and surface estates. Specifically, K.R.S. section 381.940 provided
that if the deed fails to specifically identify the method of mining
to be employed:
it shall be held, in the absence of clear and convincing evidence
to the contrary, that the intentions of the parties to the instru-
ment was that the coal be extracted only by the method or
methods of commercial coal extraction commonly known to
be in use in Kentucky in the area affected at the time the
instrument was executed. 9'
The court in Akers held that the effect of this statute, if
constitutional, would be the disappearance of strip mining under
broad form deeds. 92 The court, however, deemed the statute
and the general economic well-being of the state and its people;
(6) To codify a rule of construction for mineral deeds relating to coal
extraction so as to implement the intention of the parties at the time the
instrument was created; and
(7) To foster certainty and uniformity in the operation of the law. (Enact.
Acts 1984, ch. 28, § 1, effective July 13, 1984).
381.935. Definitions. - For the purpose of KRS § 381.940, "method" and "methods"
means underground, surface, auger, or open pit mining and nothing in KRS § 381.940
shall be interpreted to adversely affect the use of modern equipment or machinery with
respect to mining methods permitted under KRS § 381.940 (Enact. Acts 1984, ch. 28 §
3, effective July 13, 1984).
381.940. Rules of construction for mineral deeds relating to coal extraction. - In any
instrument heretofore or hereafter executed purporting to sever the surface and mineral
estates or to grant a mineral estate or to grant a right to extract minerals, which fails
to state or describe in express and specific terms the method of coal extraction to be
employed, or where said instrument contains language subordinating the surface estate
to the mineral estate, it shall be held, in the absence of clear and convincing evidence
to the contrary, that the intention of the parties to the instrument was that the coal be
extracted only by the method or methods of commercial coal extraction commonly
known to be used in Kentucky in the area affected at the time the instrument was
executed, and that the mineral estate be dominant to the surface estate only for the
purposes of coal extraction by the method or methods of commercial coal extraction
commonly known to be in use in Kentucky in the area affected at the time the instrument
was executed. (Enact. Acts 1984, ch. 28 § 2, effective July 13, 1984.).
381.945. Written agreement in deed directing how surface to be reclaimed. - In any deed
in which the minerals are severed from the surface, the present owners of the surface
rights may enter into a written agreement directing how the surface shall be reclaimed,
and how the property shall be left after the extraction of the minerals, and in compliance
with federal and state rules and regulations. (Enact. Acts 1984, ch. 28, § 4, effective
July 13, 1984).
i1 ld. at § 381.940.
12 736 S.W.2d at 307 (Ky. 1987).
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unconstitutional. 9 Opponents of the legislation offered a variety
of arguments that would render the statute unconstitutional. For
instance, the intervening coal companies argued that the statute
violated section 19 of the Kentucky Constitution by impairing
the obligation of contracts. 94 Additionally, the intervening parties
contended that the statute deprived individuals of property with-
out due process of law thereby violating the fifth and fourteenth
amendments of the U.S. Constitution. 9 Opponents of the Min-
eral Deed Act also maintained that the Act constituted a taking
without just compensation and therefore violated section 13 of
the Kentucky Constitution.
96
The Akers court, however, "found it unnecessary to discuss" 97
these grounds of alleged unconstitutionality. Instead, they ac-
cepted the fourth argument of the mineral owners and struck
down the statute as an "illegal legislative excursion into the
judicial authority.' '
The logic used by the court was that the statute dictated the
type of mining required under broad form deeds in the absence
of "clear and convincing evidence to the contrary." 99 The court,
however, felt that no "clear and convincing" evidence existed
since strip mining was non-existent in the years broad form deeds
were executed.1°0 Hence, the court concluded that the statute
created an irrebuttable presumption constituting a substantive
rule of law and was therefore "constitutionally impermissi-
ble." 10' The statute was unconstitutional because "the power to
make rules and to determine substantive issues of law is solely
within the power of the judiciary." 02 In summarizing, the court
93 Id. at 310.
' Brief of Intervenor, supra note 51, at 21.
I9 d. at 29.
Id. at 33.
- 736 S.W.2d at 310.
" Id. at 307.
" Id. at 308.
- Id. at 309.
10, Id.
,"I Id. The court concluded that the creation of a "substantive rule of law" by the
General Assembly violated the following section of the Kentucky Constitution:
§ 27 Legislative, executive and judicial departments
The powers of the government of the Commonwealth of Kentucky shall
be divided into three distinct departments, and each of them confined to
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held that "[w]hen an act of the General Assembly violates the
principle of the separation of powers. . .[the court is] obligated
to vitiate such legislative action."' °3
C. Dissent
Akers v. Baldwin upheld the Buchanan v. Watson decision
allowing mineral owners under broad form deeds to strip mine
and struck down the Mineral Deed Act prohibiting such strip
mining, but the court split 4-3 on both of these issues. 4 Obvi-
ously, if a justice unpersuaded by the arguments of the mineral
owners replaces one of the justices accepting the argument (Ste-
phens, Liebson, Vance and Gant) the tenuous balance of Akers
could be easily rearranged. The decision to overrule the exclusion
of damages as set forth in Buchanan is stable, however, since
the justices reached a unanimous conclusion. 105
III. Akers v. Baldwin-The Ramifications
Two of the three aforementioned conclusions unequivocally
reaffirm the tremendous rights of mineral owners under broad
form deeds. By upholding the right granted in Buchanan, while
simultaneously striking down the Mineral Deed Act, the court
removed any doubt that mineral owners in Kentucky have a
a separate body of magistracy, to wit: Those which are legislative, to one;
those which are executive, to another; and those which are judicial, to
another.
§ 28 Power of one department not to be exercised by the other
No person, or collection of persons, being of one of those departments,
shall exercise any power properly belonging to either of the others, except
in the instances hereinafter expressly directed or permitted.
§ 109 The judicial power; unified system; impeachment
The judicial power of the Commonwealth shall be vested exclusively in one
Court of Justice which shall be divided into a Supreme Court, a Court of
Appeals, a trial court of general jurisdiction known as the circuit court
and a trial court of limited jurisdiction known as the district court. The
court shall constitute a unified judicial system for operation and adminis-
tration. The impeachment powers of the general assembly shall remain
inviolate. Id.
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right to strip mine under broad form deeds. The decision, how-
ever, may have raised as many questions as it answered.
A. Effect of Akers v. Baldwin on Commerce Union Bank v.
Kinkade
In discussing Commerce Union Bank v. Kinkade'°6 the Akers
majority noted that Commerce Union restricted the virtually
unlimited rights of mineral owners under broad form deeds and
required that each challenged deed be considered on a case-by-
case basis.'0 7 Unfortunately, the Akers court went on to hold
that "to the extent Commerce Union is inconsistent with the
present opinion, Commerce Union is overruled." 08
This statement implies that Commerce Union conflicts with
Akers, yet close analysis fails to reveal the inconsistency. Con-
sequently, whether Commerce Union presents "good law" is
unclear. This dilemma is significant since Commerce Union con-
stitutes a logical, well-reasoned opinion' °9 which, as Akers noted,
requires a deed-by-deed analysis. In short, Commerce Union
held that all mineral deeds carry with them certain implied rights
to use the surface as reasonably necessary to exploit the min-
eral."10 Commerce Union indicates that only deeds creating "a
definite enlargement of specified mining rights" permit the owner
to conduct mining operations contrary to those rights typically
implied in a mineral grant."'
Commerce Union created an analytical framework to deter-
mine whether a deed conveyed the right to strip mine; specifi-
cally, did the language in the deed constitute a definite
enlargement of specified mining rights? This framework repre-
sented a vast improvement over the traditional technique of
hinging the right to strip mine on the characterization of a deed
as a "broad form" or "Mayo" variety."1
2
1- 540 S.W.2d 861 (Ky. 1976).
1w 736 S.W.2d at 304.
1o Id.
,"9 Interview with Robert M. Pfeiffer, Assistant Professor of Law, University of
Kentucky, in Lexington, Kentucky (Oct. 14, 1987).
110 540 S.W.2d at 863. (citing Wiser Oil Company v. Conley, 346 S.W.2d 718 (Ky.
1960)). See supra text accompanying note 30.
540 S.W.2d at 863.
. Interview, supra note 109.
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Since Akers only overrules Buchanan and its progeny (in-
cluding Commerce Union) regarding the exclusion of damages,
the holding of Commerce Union apparently remains unaffected
since Commerce Union makes no reference to damages. Conse-
quently the meaning behind the court's overruling of Commerce
Union, but only to the extent it conflicts with Akers, is point-
lessly perplexing.
B. Exclusion of Damages Occuring Between Buchanan v.
Watson and Akers v. Baldwin Decisions
In overruling Buchanan regarding the surface owner's waiver
of damages," 3 the Akers court restored a semblance of equality
to the rights of mineral and surface owners. However, the court
limited the payment of damages by excluding the mineral owner
from liability for "all conveyances by broad form deed, and
leases and mining efforts under broad form deeds, made between
the effective dates of Buchanan, May 4, 1956, and the initial
rendition date of this decision." 11 4 This prospective application
of the allowance for damages may affect but a miniscule portion
of the surface area subject to potential strip mining under the
still-viable Buchanan:
Akers appears to exempt not only conveyances by broad form
deed after Buchanan but also 'leases and mining efforts under
broad form deeds' made post-Buchanan and pre-Akers ...
Akers thus appears to allow the benefits of such leases or
conveyances to the assigned under future conveyances pertain-
ing to the same property.
15
When the severance of the estate is based upon a broad form
deed, or a lease under a broad form deed, the application of
this holding is straightforward. Simply put, the mineral owner
is not liable for damages if the deed was entered into during the
interval excluded by Akers. However, the exclusion of "mining
736 S.W.2d at 305.
'" See supra note 84.
' Address by Paul R. Collins, Kentucky Mineral Law Symposium, in Lexington,
Kentucky (Oct. 2, 1987).
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efforts" under broad form deeds is not so clear. What consti-
tutes a "mining effort"? Do damages that result from surveying
constitute a "mining effort" and thereby preclude liability for
damages to the surface estate?"16 Does exploration qualify as a
"mining effort" and shield the mineral owner from liability
from damages? Further, does the mere submission of a mining
permit achieve "mining effort" status? Lastly, does collecting
baseline water samples months before the application for a min-
ing permit is submitted constitute a "mining effort"? Obviously,
the delineation between what is and is not a mining effort is
unclear - yet potentially significant.
C. Measurement and Payment of Damages
The court's decision to abandon the portion of Buchanan v.
Watson that precluded the payment of damages is an attempt
to reconcile the law in Kentucky with the needs of the surface
owners. 1 7 The court held that damages would be the difference
in the market value immediately before and after the "use of
the surface" by the mineral owner."' The value of the surface
includes all improvements, and the "use of the surface" includes
any and all reclamation." 9
Although the court expressed good intentions in allowing
surface owners to recover damages, the application of Akers is
so restricted that recovery is highly unlikely. For instance, if a
broad form deed was used to sever the estates prior to Buchanan
and the surface was subsequently stripped, recovery would be
barred by Kentucky's statute of limitations. 20 Similarly, any
conveyance, lease, or mining effort conducted in reliance upon
Buchanan precludes the recovery of damages. Thus, the only
instances in which damages are available under Akers v. Baldwin
116 It seems safe to assume that the requirements that the method of mining not be
"oppressive, arbitrary, wanton or malicious" still applies to deeds executed in the time
period between Buchanan v. Watson, 290 S.W.2d 40 (Ky. 1956) and Akers v. Baldwin,
736 S.W.2d 294 (Ky. 1987).
,,7 736 S.W.2d at 306.
"I Id. at 307.
119 Id.
-o KRS § 413.120(4) provides a five year statute of limitations for actions arising
from trespass on real property.
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is when the deed was activated prior to Buchanan and was not
relied upon as a basis for a conveyance, lease or mining effort
during the "grace period" between Buchanan and Akers. The
recovery of damages will be the exception rather than the rule.
Should the above requirements be met and damages be re-
coverable, the measure of damages will be the difference between
fair market value of the surface immediately before use by the
mineral owner and immediately after all reclamation has been
completed.1 21 Granted, this standard for measuring damage to
real estate is well established in Kentucky, 122 yet it does not seem
appropriate for assessing strip mining damages. This problem
with this measurement is that, following the enactment of the
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, the miner
is required to conduct extensive reclamation of the surface.
123
Consequently, the value of the surface is quite often greater
after the reclamation than before the strip mining began. 124 Thus,
in those few instances in which damages are recoverable, the
amount of damages may be zero when based on the currently
applicable formula.
The above remedy does not take into account reparation for
the loss of use or enjoyment of the surface estate. Such depri-
vation is of prime concern when the property in question is a
homesite or farm from which income or pleasure might be
derived.
One proposal for a fair measure of damages applicable in
the instant situation is that "[sluch damages . . . would be
measured by the reduction in the value of the land for surface
use." ' This measure would compare the difference between the
fair market value of the surface uses before strip mining and
after mining and reclamation with the addition of compensation
2 736 S.W.2d at 307.
11 Island Creek Coal Co. v. Rodgers, 644 S.W.2d 339 (Ky. 1982). See supra note
88.
123 SMCRA §§ 101-908, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1982).
'2' Interview with F.A. Lewis, Professional Mining Engineer, in Lexington, Ken-
tucky (Oct. 10, 1987). Following reclamation the surface will usually be suitable for
farming. Prior to strip mining and reclamation the surface is often not tillable. Therefore,
the value after stripping may be greater than before stripping. Id.
2I Kuntz, The Law Relating to Oil and Gas in Wyoming, 3 Wyo. L.J. 107, 115,
reprinted at 34 OKLA. L. REV. 28, 37 (1981).
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for the interference with the surface estate which may have
denied the owner the use of the property. 26 Basing any measure
of "use' ' 2 7 on the way the property had been used before mining
would be a meaningful method of measuring the lost "use." As
noted previously, with the requisite reclamation to be effected
by the mineral estate, no damages may actually be forthcoming,
unless the surface owner is at least compensated for the depri-
vation of the enjoyment and use of his estate. 
28
One commentator has suggested that a rule which allows the
mineral owner to destroy the surface creates, in effect, "a private
right of condemnation" 129 and that damages appropriate for
condemnation should be applied. The traditional measure of
damages in condemnation is the fair market value of the prop-
erty taken, plus damages minus any benefit to the undisturbed
property. 130 The depreciation of adjoining lands is also taken
into account by this formula. 3'
Lastly, in those few situations in which the surface owner is
entitled to recover damages under Akers, and damages exist
according to the formula, payment is not required until any and
all reclamation of the surface is complete.'32 Since the actual
mining could last an indeterminable number of years, and since
reclamation could easily last an additional 5 to 10 years after
mining is concluded, the mineral owner could be forced to
literally wait decades before payment of damages is received.
Justice Stephenson, writing a separate opinion in Akers in which
he dissented in part and concurred in part, expressed the hope
that the damages allowable under Akers will be paid in advance
2 Id.
127 Id.
"I Where reclamation is involved, "there is a risk that establishing the value of
interference with the surface estate . . . subject to reclamation will result in a swearing
contest between expert witnesses." J. Lowe, What Substances Are Minerals?, 30 ROCKY
MTN. MIN. L. INST. § 2.05[21(c) (1984).
12 Norvell, Developing Land Characterized by Separate Ownership of Oil and Gas
and Surface Minable Coal and Uranium - The Other Side of Aker v. Guinn and Its
Progeny, 33 OIL & GAS INST. 193, 200 (1982).
130 P. NICHOLS, THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN, § 12.[4] (rev. 3d ed. 1985).
- See, e.g., Bader v. Jefferson County, 119 S.W.2d 870 (1938) (damages allowable
for impact on adjacent property).
12 736 S.W.2d at 307.
[VOL. 4:213
BROAD FORM DEED REVISITED
to the surface owner,' 33 although this point was not clarified by
the Akers majority opinion. The mineral owner's right to ravish
the surface could have been made contingent upon the prior
payment of compensation to the surface owner; otherwise, the
surface owner had no protection whatsoever against the subse-
quent insolvency of the miner.
Some courts have predicated the right of the mineral owner
to destroy the surface on the balancing of the likely injury to
the surface against the value, economic and societal, of the
minerals to be extracted. 3 4 Unless the minerals to be removed
were worth proportionately more than the land surface to be
disturbed or there existed a strong public policy necessitating
extraction, the mineral owner would not be allowed to disturb
the surface even though damages would be forthcoming. Under
this theory, the mineral estate is "treated as 'dominant' in the
sense that it can be developed whenever it is economical to do
so ... [while preserving] surface values which were probably
not intended to be bargained away by what is so often a rather
casual expression of intent leading to a potentially destructive
burden."' 35
Other jurisdictions have seen the need to statutorily protect
this vulnerable interest of the surface owner and require that,
where a severance of the estates has occurred, the surface owner
may demand security from the mineral owner and, if such se-
curity is not forthcoming, the miner may be enjoined from
proceeding . 36 Kentucky does not have such a statutory measure
of protection but does, through its regulatory program, require
bonds to be posted for the guarantee of the reclamation ex-
pense. 37 If Justice Stephenson's hopes are well-founded' and
3 Id. at 315.
13 New Mexico & Arizona Land Co. v. Elkins, 137 F. Supp. 767 (D.N.M. 1956),
appeals dismissed with consent of appellees, 239 F.2d 645 (10th Cir. 1956); Barker v.
Mintz, 215 P. 534 (Colo. 1923).
115 R. Maxwell, The Meaning of Minerals - The Relationship of Interpretation and
Surface Burden, 8 TEX. TEcH. L. REV. 255, 280, 282 (1966-67).
136 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 34-48-106 (1984); IDAHO CODE § 47-609 (1977); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 38-02-10 (1987); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 45-4-13 (1983); Wyo. STAT.
§ 30-1-119 (1977).
13 KRS § 350.060(11).
38 See supra text accompanying note 133.
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compensation will be required in advance, Akers v. Baldwin will
become more meaningful to the owner of the surface estate.
CONCLUSION
The majority opinion in Akers clearly accentuates the reluc-
tance of Kentucky's high court to revoke the rights of mineral
owners under broad form deeds as established in Buchanan v.
Watson. Conversely, the 4-3 split on this issue exposes the fragile
status of the precedent.
By overturning that portion of Buchanan which excluded
payment of damages to the surface owner, the court recognized
the unfairness of prior holdings. The practical effect of this
decision, however, will be virtually nil.
The statutory response of the General Assembly to the per-
ceived inequalities surrounding Buchanan and its progeny accu-
rately reflects the public sentiment regarding those decisions.
Whether the decisions in Akers will effectively placate the public
anxiety is, of course, yet to be seen. In retrospect, the introduc-
tion of this comment seems to also be an appropriate conclusion,
for it is readily apparent "that the final word on broad form
deeds in Kentucky has yet to be heard."'3 9
PATRICK J. SHEERAN AND DAVID T. WILSON, II
"I Pfeiffer, supra note 3, at 96.
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